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Gay Marriage in Rhode Island:
A Big Issue in a Small State
Joan Catherine Bohl"

INTRODUCTION

In the 2003 opinion of Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health,1 a plurality of the justices 2 on the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that denying a marriage license to a same-sex
couple violated the state constitution. 3 Three dissenting members
of the court, each writing separately, attacked, among other
things, the plurality's very premise. 4 Some scholars and pundits
5
heralded the opinion as an unprecedented victory for civil rights,
6
some condemned it as a destructive aberration.
But, as a

Assistant Professor of Legal Writing at Stetson University College of Law.
1. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
2. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the plurality opinion, id. at 948, and
was joined by Justices Cowin and Ireland. Justice Greaney filed a concurring
opinion, id. at 970; Justice Spina filed a dissenting opinion, id. at 974, and
was joined by Justices Sosman and Cordy.
3. Id. at 969.
4. Id. at 974.
5. See, e.g., Lisa Keen, Battle Brews Over MarriageLawsuits, Strategies
Questioned, BETWEEN THE LINES, May 18, 2006, at 8, available at
http://www.pridesource.com/download/1420-May- 18.pdf;
Joanna
L.
Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and
Some Lessons from the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 87 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Michael Gaynor, Values: Why Republicans Generally
Remain Far Preferable (May 18, 2006), http://www.renewamerica.us
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practical matter, was the opinion such an extraordinary departure
from a foundation of statutes, case law and public policy laid down
over years, both in Massachusetts and in other states? Or simply
the natural and logical, if unanticipated, extension of what had
come before? For example, could the members of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court examine Rhode Island's legal landscape in light of
the decisional framework the Goodridge plurality supplied and
conclude that gay marriage is a constitutional necessity in Rhode
Island as well? This Article takes the position that it could. The
same legal building blocks on which the Goodridge plurality
rested each have a Rhode Island corollary. This Article will locate
and assemble them, demonstrating how and why the Rhode Island
Supreme Court could choose to join the Goodridge plurality.
This Article is in five parts. Part I gives the factual and
procedural background to Goodridge. It also provides a brief
overview of the plaintiff couples' legal arguments. My goal in this
last regard is very modest. Numerous learned pieces have already
explored the intricacies of the constitutional arguments on both
sides of the issue. 7 I seek only to give the reader a sense of the
constitutional arguments plaintiffs invoked as they relate to the
specific outcome of this - and any similar - legal challenge. Part

II outlines the Goodridge plurality decision itself, isolating and
highlighting the components of its analysis. Part III discusses the
nature of marriage and family law in Rhode Island. Marriage
obviously has virtually the same far reaching social significance in
any state. Rhode Island law affecting marriage and family life,
however, has already demonstrated a capacity to adapt to
changing family configurations that seems a short step removed
from recognizing gay marriage. Indeed, Rhode Island's legal
recognition of the changing face of the American family may
already exceed the level of analogous recognition found in preGoodridge Massachusetts law. Part IV examines how judicial
review of Rhode Island's marriage law could unfold, if the
Goodridge plurality's approach were followed.
Finally, in
/columns/gaynor/060518; Lynn D. Wardle, The Curious Case of the Missing
Legal Analysis, 18 BYU J. PuB. L. 309 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional
Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1 (1996); Craig W.
Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values
by a "Simulacrumof Marriage",66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1998).
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conclusion, Part V touches briefly on the dissenting justices'
position in Goodridge, while summarizing the established law that
could logically lead to recognition of gay marriage in Rhode Island.
I.

THE BACKSTORY 8

During March and early April of 2001, seven same-sex couples
in five different Massachusetts counties applied for marriage
licenses from the appropriate city or town clerk's office. 9 Each
couple completed the required forms' 0 and paid the license fee. In
each case the clerk either refused to accept the notice of intention
to marry form or refused to issue a marriage license. 1'
In Massachusetts, the Department of Public Health has
statutory responsibility for the issuance of marriage licenses and
oversees the registry of vital records and statistics which "enforces
all laws" relating to the issuance of marriage licenses.' 2 A
Commissioner of Public Health retains ultimate supervisory
authority. 13 On April 11, the couples sued the Department of
Public Health and the Commissioner of Public Health alleging
that the denial of marriage licenses violated the Massachusetts
14
state constitution.
The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment in
favor of the Department of Health and the Commissioner, 15
holding that the "plain wording" of the marriage laws precluded
an interpretation that marriage was permitted between same-sex
Although the marriage law provisions did not
couples. 16
specifically limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, 17 the definition
of marriage derived from the common-law concept of a union
The consanguinity
between one man and one woman. 18
8. Backstory: "1. The experiences of a character or the circumstances of
an event that occur before the action or narrative of a literary, cinematic or
dramatic work. 2. A prequel." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 131 (4th ed. 2000).

9.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.

10. Id.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

950.
949.
950 n.4.
950.
951.

at 952.
at 953.
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provisions, furthermore, support this interpretation. 19
The
Superior Court also concluded that the state constitution did not
guarantee "the fundamental right to marry a person of the same
sex," 20 and that such a restriction was rationally related to a
legislative goal of protecting and promoting procreation. 2 1 The
plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct
22
appellate review.
The plaintiffs first argued that the language of the
Massachusetts marriage licensing law is actually gender neutral,
both in terms of the minimal qualifications it sets and in terms of
its record keeping requirements. 2 3 Massachusetts marriage law
restricts the circumstances under which people less than eighteen
years of age may marry. 24 It prohibits marriage between people
with certain communicable diseases and prohibits polygamous
marriages. 25 It also restricts marriages between men and women
who are related by certain degrees of consanguinity. 26 None of
these restrictions or requirements
literally prevent a
Massachusetts clerk from issuing a marriage license to a same-sex
couple. All plaintiffs were at least eighteen years of age, none had
the specified diseases or were seeking polygamous unions, and so
on; thus, the plaintiffs argued, the court could resolve the case in
their favor without addressing any constitutional questions at
all.27

In the alternative, the plaintiffs advanced arguments focusing
on the nature of marriage itself rather than on the terms of the
governing statutes. The plaintiffs invoked their substantive due
process right to be free from government intrusion in decisions
relating to family life. 28 The United States Supreme Court has
19. Id. at 951.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 952.
24. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 7, 25, 27 (2003)).
25. Id. at 951 (citing MASs. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 4, 8, 28A (2003)).
26. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 1, 2 (2003)).
27. Id. at 949 (describing the plaintiffs).
28. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21, 24, Goodridge, 798
N.E.2d 941 (No. SJC-08860) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)). The plaintiffs also argued that

the statutory limitation on marital partners constituted sex discrimination, a
point the Supreme Judicial Court apparently did not consider sufficiently
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recognized that the state may not intrude on this protected sphere
of life to prohibit interracial marriage, 29 the use of birth control by
31
married couples, 30 or abortion at early stages of pregnancy.
These rights are within the same zone of privacy protecting all
other aspects of family life and childrearing. 32 In essence, the
plaintiffs argued that the liberty interest in the creation and
management of one's family applies to the choice of one's spouse.
The plaintiffs thus framed the issue as a facet of the right to
marry, not as the right to marry a person of the same sex. 33
Furthermore, if the choice of one's partner, including a same-sex
partner, is thus protected then the state may interfere with the
choice only in order to further a compelling state interest, and
34
only by means narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
In addition to the substantive argument that the decision to
marry a person of the same sex is part of one's liberty interest in
the self-definition of family, the plaintiffs made a related
procedural argument. Since marriage is a fundamental right,
they argued, the marriage statutes must apply equally to all
individuals who otherwise qualify, whether they want to marry a
same-sex partner or an opposite-sex partner. 3 5
This equal
protection argument draws heavily on decisions that invalidate
restrictions on interracial marriage.

persuasive to merit discussion. Id. at 8.
29. Id. passim (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
30. Id. at 25, 83 n.61 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)).
31. Id. at 12, 22, 27, 40 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992)).
32. Id. at 42-48.
33. This seemingly semantic distinction was critical to the Superior
Court's rejection of the plaintiffs' argument. The Superior Court held that
although opposite-sex marriage is a fundamental right "deeply rooted in the
nation's history and tradition," a right to "same sex marriage" was not.
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, No. 20011647A, 2002 WL
1299135, at *9, *11 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 7, 2002) (citations omitted).
34. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 28, at 28-29 (citing Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1978); Marcoux v. Att'y Gen., 375 Mass. 63,
66 (1978)).
35. Id. at 33-34.
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IL THE GOODRIDGEPLURALITY DECISION
The Goodridge plurality first set the stage for its decision by
introducing each individual member of the plaintiff couples. 36 The
court was addressing whether the state can constitutionally ban

37
same-sex partners - any same-sex partners -- from marrying.

The details of these plaintiffs' lives - length of their relationships,
their professions and the ages of their children, for example were technically irrelevant. 38 Yet by beginning with this litany of
human detail, the plurality shifted the focus away from any broad
or general formulation of the issue. Clearly, the state's ban on gay
marriage must be justifiable, if at all, when seen in the context of
specific human experiences.
The Goodridge plurality held, of course, that the ban on gay
marriage was unconstitutional. Its holding rests on three basic
points. First, Goodridge affirmed the importance of marriage as
an institution, 39 and noted the general state policy favoring
marriage. 40 In this regard, the court noted that marital status is a
significant source of social, financial, and legal benefits for those
who marry and for marital children. 4 1 It noted that the state
facilitates bringing children into families, whether by "traditional"
means, assisted reproduction or adoption, and does so without
regard to parents' marital status. 4 2 State policy is to provide all
children with an opportunity to flourish. 4 3 By exploring the
diverse range of practical benefits that flow from marriage,

36. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949-50 (Mass.
2003).
37.
38.
matter
strikes

Id. at 948.
Facial invalidation of a statute means that it is unconstitutional no
how it is applied. In contrast, invalidating a statute "as applied"
down the statute only as it was applied to the individuals petitioning

the court. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges
and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2000); Michael C.
Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235,
237-38
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

(1994).
798 N.E.2d at 957.
Id. at 955-57.
Id. at 956-57.
Id. at 962 n.24.
Id. at 963.
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Goodridge essentially set the ground rules for judicial review.
Logically, if the practical implications of marriage are so far
reaching, then any defense of current limitations on who may
marry must be practical and comprehensive as well.
Second, Goodridge noted that the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the essential dignity of private, consensual sexual
relationships in Lawrence v. Texas.44 Lawrence thus expressly
45
overruled the High Court's prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,
and found intimate homosexual relationships entitled to the same
privacy under the Federal Constitution 4 6 formerly accorded only to
intimate heterosexual relationships.
Finally, Goodridge addressed the nature and level of
It did not conclude that the
appropriate judicial review.
Massachusetts constitution offers more protection than the
Federal Constitution, 47 but did observe that the liberty and
equality guarantees of the Massachusetts constitution both
protect citizens from unwarranted government intrusion into
protected spheres of life and guarantees 'freedom to' partake in
benefits created by the state for the common good. '48 It then
applied a form of rational basis review that incorporated both
social science data and logic to conclude that restricting marriage
Under ordinary
to opposite-sex couples is irrational. 49
circumstances this approach alone would pose quite a formidable
barrier to the defense. In Massachusetts such heightened rational
basis is not "toothless"'50 and requires far more than unsupported

44. Id. at 948 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
45. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
47. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (stating, without further qualification,
that "[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of
individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution") (emphasis
added); see also Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Mass. 1999)
(noting that the Massachusetts Constitution generally provides due process
protection that is coextensive with the protection afforded by the United
States Constitution); Trigones v. Att'y Gen., 652 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Mass.
1995) (holding that "[flor the purpose of due process analysis, our standard of
review under the cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights usually is comparable to that under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution").
48. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959.
49. Id. at 961.
50. Id. at 960 n.20.
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assumptions 5' that prove sufficient to satisfy classic rational basis
review. 52 Furthermore, since the court also framed its inquiry
around the specific tangible benefits marriage provides family
members, it easily found no specific rational bases for denying
53
them to same-sex couples.
To a limited extent, Goodridge rests on logic, unsupported and
unsupportable by hard data. For example, the court responded to
the argument that same-sex marriage would destroy the
institution of marriage itself by commenting that a same-sex
couple's desire to marry is a testament to the institution's
continued viability. 54 It is impossible to evaluate whether the
justices on the Rhode Island Supreme Court would follow the
same logic. Most of Goodridge, however, rests on types of
precedent and policy found in Rhode Island as well as in
Massachusetts. Considered in this light, no significant barrier
currently exists in Rhode Island law that would prevent the
Goodridge analysis from unfolding there.
III. THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE
In Rhode Island, as in all states, marriage represents not only
a profound personal commitment but access to a far reaching
array of important and even lucrative benefits. 55 In Rhode Island,
51. Id. at 960 (citing English v. New England Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d 329,
333 (Mass. 1989)).
52. Lindsley v. Nat'l Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (noting
that a law will withstand rational basis review "if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state
of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed"). For a more
recent statement of the rational basis standard in a factually relevant
context, see Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family
Services, 377 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that under typical
rational basis review, "[t]he question is simply whether the challenged
legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest"). Under this
deferential standard, a legislative classification "is accorded a strong
presumption of validity," Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993), and "must
be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification," id. at 320 (citation omitted). This holds true "even if the law
seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the
rationale for it seems tenuous." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
53. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960-66.
54. Id. at 965.
55. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the
Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same Sex Marriage,68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745,
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as in Massachusetts, entry into marriage is controlled by licensing
statutes which clearly contemplate a union between one man and
one woman. 56 But, as the Supreme Judicial Court noted, this
conception of marriage is rooted in common law. 57 In Rhode
Island, as in Massachusetts, however, the common-law restriction
does not necessarily mean that a challenge to the marriage
licensing laws is doomed to fail.
Rhode Island case law, even more clearly than Massachusetts
case law, explicitly recognizes that the institution of marriage
must evolve to keep pace with society. For instance, in Landmark
Medical Center v. Gauthier,58 a medical center sought payment for
medical services provided to the defendant's deceased husband, 59
arguing that the defendant was liable under the doctrine of
necessaries. 6 0 The trial court certified a question to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, asking whether the doctrine of necessaries
61
obligated a wife to pay for services provided to her husband,
given that, at common law, such an obligation was imposed on the
62
husband only.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court unhesitatingly rejected a
literal interpretation of the common-law doctrine, 63 and required
the defendant wife to pay.6 4 The court noted that, originally, the
doctrine of necessaries was simply a recognition of the fact that, at
65
common law, a woman lost all property rights upon marriage.
One who provided services to a married woman would have had no
choice but to look to the husband for payment. 6 6
Modern
marriage, on the other hand, is "a shared enterprise, a joint
67
undertaking that in many ways * * * is akin to a partnership."
782-86 (1994) (listing benefits flowing from marriage).
56. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 to -6 (2003).
57. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 952.
58. 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994).
59. Id. at 1146.
60. Id. at 1152 (noting that "Landmark[sought] an evenhanded approach
to the necessaries doctrine").
61. Id. at 1147.
62. Id. at 1149.
63. Id. at 1152.
64. Id. at 1149.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1149-50.
67. Id. at 1152 (quoting Jersey Shore Med. Ctr.-Filkin Hosp. v. Baum's
Estate, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J. 1980)).
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Women were no longer limited to the role of homemaker, and to
''68
continue to adhere to "outdated policy" would be "utterly unfair.
Thus, the court held that the doctrine of necessaries applied
equally to either the husband or wife, rendering either financially
69
liable for necessary goods or services provided to the other.
Furthermore, the court concluded that its holding could be
properly applied retroactively to the defendant widow in the case
before it because profound social change had so clearly
"foreshadowed" such a reinterpretation. 70 In this respect, the
court concluded, the institution of marriage had evolved, and so
must the law.
Furthermore, Rhode Island state policy favoring marriage is
expressed, as in Massachusetts, through state laws that confer a
variety of benefits on married couples simply because they are
married. Some examples illustrate these policies. Spouses enjoy a
marital privilege in civil trials; one may not testify against the
other except in a proceeding intended to dissolve the marital
relationship itself.7 1 A decedent's spouse is the beneficiary under
the state's wrongful death act. 72 A married person is entitled to
recover damages for loss of consortium caused by tortuous injury
to his or her spouse. 73 Additionally, access to some property rights
and state benefits would not exist but for marriage. For example,
surviving spouses receive a vested life estate in real property
owned by the decedent at death. 74 Also, a "Community Spouse
Resource Allowance" (CSRA) is available to the "spouse remaining
in the community when one member of a married couple must be
institutionalized for medical reasons. '75
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1153.
71.

R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-17-13 (1997); Baker v. Traudt, WC No. 88-46, 1988

R.I. Super LEXIS 9 (R.I. Super. Nov. 16, 1998).
72. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-2 (1997 & Supp. 2005); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 680-81 (R.I. 1999).
73. R.I. GEN. LAws § 10-7-1.2; Egan v. Ashley, C.A. No. 93-545, 1994 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 100 (R.I. Super. June 21, 1994).
74. See Carr v. Carr, C.A. No. PP 88-4085, 1993 R.I. Super. LEXIS 7 (R.I.
Super. Apr. 22, 1993) (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-25-2 (1995)).
75. See Laporte v. R.I. Dep't of Human Servs., C.A. No. PC 05-0077, 2005
R.I. Super. LEXIS 163, at *1-8 (R.I. Super. Nov. 9, 2005) (describing the
Department of Health Services' assessment that takes place prior to a
determination of medical assistance eligibility).
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For children, the marital status of their parents is so crucial
to their well being that Rhode Island, like Massachusetts, has
taken affirmative steps to ensure that non-marital children enjoy
legal rights equivalent to the rights of marital children. At
common law, children whose parents were married had an
automatic right to support and a right to inherit from their
fathers. Illegitimate children, in contrast, were "nullius filius" at
common law - literally "no one's son. '76 By statute, Rhode Island
has provided that illegitimate children may inherit from a
deceased parent "as if born in lawful wedlock. '77 Similarly,
portions of the Uniform Paternity Act were enacted to provide a
means of obtaining support for illegitimate children. 78 These
attempts to ensure illegitimate children's rights cannot substitute,
of course, for the full panoply of intangible benefits that marital
children enjoy through their parents. Attempts to equalize
children's status do demonstrate, however, both the significance of
marriage and a corresponding state policy of eliminating the
penalty of illegitimacy insofar as it affects innocent children.
Accordingly, under Rhode Island as well as Massachusetts
law, marriage must be understood as a wellspring of many specific
and tangible benefits.
IV.

PRIVACY FOR INTIMATE, CONSENSUAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS

In 2003, the United States Supreme Court swept away longstanding barriers to official state acceptance of consensual adult
homosexual intimacy. In Lawrence v. Texas 79 the Court reviewed
a challenge to a Texas criminal statute prohibiting "deviate sexual
intercourse"8 0 and brought by two men who were apprehended
while engaged in private, consensual sexual activity within the
home.
In ruling that the statute was unconstitutional, the
Lawrence Court noted that a core concept of human dignity 8'

76. See Ronald J. Resmini, The Law of Domestic Relations in Rhode

Island, 29 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 379, 464 (1995) (citing Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977); In re Estate of Cherkas, 506 A.2d 1029, 1029-30
(R.I. 1986); R.I. Hosp. Trust Co. v. Hodgkin, 137 A. 381, 383 (R.I. 1927)).
77. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 33-1-8 (1995).
78. See Waldick v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I. 1985).
79. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
80. Id. at 563 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003)).
81. See id. at 567.
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embodied in the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment precluded government intrusion "into deeply personal
realms of consensual adult sexual intimacy and one's choice of an
intimate partner."82 Prior to Lawrence, a state seeking to sanction
gay marriage by any means would have run afoul of the United
States Supreme Court's conclusion in Bowers v. Hardwick.83 In
that case, the Court concluded that the question presented to it
was whether "the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right on homosexuals to engage in sodomy,"8 4 and answered the

question in the negative. 8 5 Lawrence overruled Bowers,8 6 noting
that this narrow formulation of the issue demonstrated the
Bowers Court's flawed understanding of the expansive liberty
issue at stake. 87 In fact, Lawrence held, all intimate adult
consensual activity was protected within the same zone of
constitutional privacy. 88 Homosexual activity that formerly could
be disapproved of or criminalized could now receive the official
sanction of marriage, as a matter of law.
Judicial Review of Rhode Island's MarriageLaw - Strict Scrutiny
or RationalBasis?
If the fundamental right to marry includes the right to marry
a person of the same sex, then marriage laws which do not allow
such marriages should be strictly scrutinized in the courts - and
probably would not survive such scrutiny.8 9 Yet Goodridge
avoided the political "hot potato" of labeling the right to enter into
a homosexual marriage as a fundamental right. It did so by
asserting that the statutory classification created by the
Massachusetts marriage law harmed same-sex households so

82. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003)
(describing the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.

558 (2003)).
83. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
84. Id. at 190.

85. Id. at 195-96.
86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

87. Id. at 567.
88. Id. at 567, 574.
89. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 981-82

(Sosman, J., dissenting) (describing the plurality's citation to cases
addressing fundamental rights analyzed under strict scrutiny while avoiding
such a label in the case before it).
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seriously and in so many ways that it could not even be considered
a legitimate exercise of the state's authority to regulate conduct;
thus, it could not even satisfy rational basis review. 9 0 In
Massachusetts, the state argued that existing marriage laws had
a rational basis because they limited the right to marry to
opposite-sex couples and thus promoted procreation and provided
the "optimum environment for childrearing." 9 1
The Goodridge plurality rejected these arguments in terms
that would transplant easily into the soil of Rhode Island law.
Goodridge noted that neither procreation nor the capacity to
procreate were requirements for a valid marriage under
Massachusetts law;92 people seeking a marriage license are not
93
asked if they plan to - or are capable of - conceiving children.

The same is true in Rhode Island. 94 Moreover, Goodridge added
that at common law even an absolute inability to engage in sexual
relations did not automatically void a marriage; 95 the common law
underpinnings of marriage law are, of course, the same in Rhode
Island.
Goodridge noted, further, that state law did not
demonstrate a preference that children grow up in families headed
by two opposite-sex parents. 96 In fact, Massachusetts had taken
explicit steps to eliminate legal distinctions between children
based on family status. 97 As outlined earlier, Rhode Island has
90.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge can

be analyzed either in terms of the classification it creates - an equal
protection analysis - or in terms of the interest affected - a substantive due

process analysis.

Id. at 953.

It elected to follow U.S. Supreme Court

precedent and disregard any theoretical analytical distinctions, noting the
"convergence of due process and equal protection principles in cases
concerning parent-child relationship," id. (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.
102, 120 (1996)), and that "[e]quality of treatment and the due process right
to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects....' Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 575).
91. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. Although the state argued these
points separately, the court noted that the first "shades imperceptibly into its
second." Id. at 962.
92. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 (explaining MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 207 §
28A (2003)).
93. Id.
94. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 to -6 (2003)).
95. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961 n.22 (citing Martin v. Otis, 124 N.E.
294 (Mass. 1919)).
96. Id. at 962.
97. Id. at 963 (citing MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 209C (2003) (paternity
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taken analogous steps, both legislatively and judicially, with the
same goal explicitly stated. Finally, Goodridge noted, generally,
that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected any notion of a typical
American family; 98 one family configuration should not be
elevated over another.
Goodridge's rational basis review departed from "typical"
rational basis review by asking whether the legislative
justifications for limitations on marriage are persuasive rather
than merely rational. 9 9 In a typical case in which plaintiffs
challenge a statute, plaintiffs must show that the legislation
cannot even "satisfy a minimum threshold of rationality."'10 0 The
Goodridge plurality, however, incorporated a version of rational
basis often associated with analysis of statutes that may harm a
disadvantaged class of people.' 0 ' In the hands of the Goodridge
plurality, rational basis review extended far beyond identifying
plausible legislative assumptions. 102 Instead, it used rational
basis review to explore and apply the logic of related state laws
and the significance of social science data. 103 Without such an
approach - the dissenters were quick to point out 104 -the plaintiff
couples would have been unsuccessful. Any court, then, that was
unwilling to expand its interpretation of rational basis could not
follow Goodridge's lead.
Rhode Island courts have already recognized such "searching"
rational basis review in other contexts, however, and so would
logically reach the same conclusion Goodridge reached using the
same approach. For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
has acknowledged that a more searching level of rational basis
review is appropriate when legislation singles out a group that
has suffered discrimination or stereotyping. 10 5 One need look no
statute); Powers v. Wilkerson, 506 N.E.2d 842 (Mass. 1987)).
98. Id. at 963 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)).

99. Id. at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 978; see also supra note 52 and cases cited therein.
101. Id. at 960 (citing English v. New England Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d 329
(Mass. 1989).

102. The Goodridge plurality did not specifically establish precedential
support for this choice of standards, electing, instead, to state generally that
in Massachusetts, rational basis is not "toothless." Id. at 960 (citations
omitted).
103. See id. at 980-81 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
104.
105.

See id. at 980; see also id. at 984 (Cordy, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 519
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farther than Rhode Island's Fair Housing Act for independent
106
legislative recognition that homosexual people are such a group.
Similarly, in Mackie v. State, a Rhode Island Superior Court used
medical and social science data to conclude that distinctions
embodied in the Rhode Island Lead Hazard Mitigation Act were
irrational. 107 The Act was designed to reduce the presence of leadbased paint in residential rental property and so to reduce the
incidence of lead poisoning in young children. 10 8 Landlords who
lived on premises in buildings consisting of three units or fewer
were exempted, however, and did not have to remove lead-based
paint. 10 9 The court found that young children in three-unit
dwellings with a landlord living on the premises were as likely to
be poisoned by lead paint as those in larger dwellings with
absentee landlords - plausible legislative assumptions concerning
property maintenance notwithstanding. 110
Viewed through the lens of this stronger rational basis
review, justifications for limiting marriage in Rhode Island to
opposite-sex couples based on the bearing and rearing of children
could easily be rejected. In Goodridge, the state asserted that the
marriage license law was rational because confining marriage to
opposite-sex couples promotes procreation and ensures that
children are raised in an optimal setting.111 Goodridge's general
reasons for rejecting this justification would apply in most states.
Noting that the United States Supreme Court has expressly
rejected the idea of a "typical" American family, 1 12 Goodridge
detailed the increase in assisted reproduction 113 and commented
that childbearing is neither a prerequisite to - nor a consequence
of - many modern marriages. 114 Furthermore, Goodridge noted
A.2d 578 (R.I. 1987).
106. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-37-4(a) (1995 & Supp. 2005).
107. C. A. No. PC05-5144, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 3 (R.I. Super. Jan. 10,
2006).
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2 (noting that the class of landlords who filed suit, challenging
the Act's classifications were "owners of residential apartment buildings and
units subject to the strictures of the Rhode Island Lead Hazard Mitigation
Act").
110. Id. at *21-22.
111. 798 N.E.2d at 961.
112. Id. at 963 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 1 (2000)).
113. Id. at 962 n.24.
113. Id. at 961 n.23 (quoting Cordy, J., dissenting: "heterosexual
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that the state conceded same-sex parents could be excellent
parents, and had not produced any evidence that same-sex
115
parenting was contrary to the best interests of the child.
Rhode Island law also supports the idea that not only can
same-sex parenting be consistent with the best interests of the
child but that existing statutes can and should accommodate
same-sex parenting. In fact, in Rubano v. DiCenzo, 116 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court may already have gone a step farther than
pre-Goodridge Massachusetts law in this regard. The Rubano
court simply accepted the idea that same-sex parenting is
consistent with the best interests of the child. 117 Further, the
court interpreted the existing legal framework to resolve the
childrearing issues that arose between the same-sex partners in
the case.
Rubano v. DiCenzo involved a lesbian couple who arranged for
a child to be born through artificial insemination.1 1 8 The couple
lived together "as domestic partners in the same household" 119
until the child, a boy, was four. At that point, differences arose
between the women and they separated. 120 The boy continued to
live with Ms. DiCenzo, his biological mother, and had informal
visitation with Ms. Rubano, his "heart mom.

12 1

After this

informal arrangement broke down, Ms. Rubano filed a
miscellaneous petition in Rhode Island Family Court to establish
de facto parental status and visitation. 122 The parties settled the
matter prior to trial through a "private agreement" which the
Chief Justice of the Family Court reviewed, approved, and entered
as an order of the court. 123 The agreement included provisions for
visitation to promote "the best interests of the minor child," 124 as

intercourse, procreation and childcare are not necessarily conjoined").
115. Id. at 963 (noting that the state readily conceded that same-sex
parents may be "excellent" parents).

116.

759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).

117.
118.

Id. at 977.
Id. at 961.

119.

Id.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 962.
Id.; see also id. at n.2 (explaining the legal significance of a consent
order or private agreement under Rhode Island law).
Id. at 962.

124.
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an agreement might in attempting to resolve a dispute between
opposite-sex parents. It was only after this agreement broke down
125
that anyone thought to contest the Family Court's jurisdiction.
At that point, three questions were certified to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, asking, in essence, whether Ms. Rubano qualified
126
as a parent.
Collectively, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's resolution of
these questions appears to validate the same-sex configuration of
family life before it. The court found it unnecessary to rule
directly on the first question, which asked whether a child, mother
and same-sex partner constituted a "family relationship" for
purposes of family court jurisdiction. 127 The court noted that the
key term for purposes of determining jurisdiction was not simply
'family relationship,"' but rather was 'equitable matters arising
out of the family relationship wherein jurisdiction is acquired by
the court by the filing of [a] petition[] for divorce"' or related
matter. 128 Since Rubano and DiCenzo had obviously filed no such
petition, the first question need not be answered at all.
The second certified question was linked to the first. If the
court concluded that the family court did not have jurisdiction by
virtue of a family relationship, did this conclusion violate the state
constitutional guarantee that every person "hav[e] recourse to the
laws for all injuries or wrongs?"1 29 The court concluded that the
125. Id. at 963.
126. The questions were: "Question I: Does a child, biological mother, and
same sex partner, who have been involved in a committed relationship
constitute a 'family relationship' within the meaning of G.L. 8-10-3, such that
the Family Court has jurisdiction to entertain a miscellaneous petition for
visitation by the former same sex partner when the same sex partner is no
longer engaged in the committed relationship?" Id. at 963; Question II: "If the
answer to the above question is in the negative, does such a conclusion
violate Article I Section 5 of the Rhode Island Constitution?" Id. at 965;
Question III: "If the answer to question I is in the affirmative, then does a
non-biological partner, who has been a same sex partner with a biological

mother have standing to petition the Rhode Island Family Court for
visitation pursuant to G.L. 15-5-1 et al. [sic]?" Id. at 976-77.

127. Id. at 963.
128. Id. at 964 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3) (emphasis added by
court). Rhode Island law also allows a suit for divorce from bed and board,
and an action for separate maintenance, as noted in the text of the statute.

Id.
129. Id. at 966.
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constitutional

guarantee

was

satisfied

because

Ms.

Rubano

actually had several possible remedies for the "injury or wrong" of
130
being denied visitation.
First, Ms. Rubano had a statutory right under Rhode Island
General Laws § 15-8-26 to ask the Family Court to determine "the
existence or nonexistence" of a mother and child relationship
between herself and the child. 13 1 The court noted that any
"interested party" could bring an action seeking such a
determination under the Uniform Law on Paternity. 132 The terms
of this law specified that provisions applicable to the father and
child relationship would apply to the mother and child
relationship "insofar as practicable."' 133 Further, the court noted,
Rhode Island case law had established that a putative parent
could seek redress under this provision without alleging a
biological relationship with the child in question. 134 Thus, Ms.
Rubano's "close involvement with the child's conception,"' 135 her
participation in his upbringing, and the parties' alleged visitation
agreement,
taken
together,
constituted
a
parent-like
relationship. 136 This parent-like relationship gave Ms. Rubano
137
standing to bring a parental rights claim.
The court identified another remedy available to Ms. Rubano
138
and arising out of the Rhode Island Uniform Law on Paternity;
this remedy further emphasized its willingness to recognize and
support same-sex family relationships. Although Ms. Rubano was
obviously not a biological father, she was "involved" in the joint
decision with DiCenzo to have DiCenzo conceive a child through
artificial insemination. 139 She also assumed primary financial
responsibility for the procedure and was included on the child's
birth announcement and baptismal certificate. 140 The court
130. Id.
131. Id. at 977.
132. Id. at 966. Rhode Island adopted a hybrid version of the Uniform Law
on Paternity. Id. (citing P.L. 1979, ch. 185 § 2).
133. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-26).
134. Id. at 967 (citing Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1990)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 970.
139. Id. at 971.
140. Id.
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explained that Ms. Rubano had a right to seek a visitation order
in the Family Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over "those
matters relating to adults who shall be involved with paternity of
children born out of wedlock." 14 1 The court conceded that the term
"paternity" ordinarily suggests "fatherhood," but noted that the
142
legislature has specifically rejected such a rigid limitation.
Rhode Island General Laws § 43-3-3 provides that "[e]very word
importing the masculine gender only may be construed to extend
to and to include females as well as males."1 4 3 Thus, if Ms.
Rubano's basic factual allegations proved true, she would have
been able to establish that she had been 'involved with [the]
paternity' of this child born out of wedlock within the meaning of
this discrete jurisdictional provision of § 8-10-3."' 144 With Family
Court jurisdiction thus established, 145 the court could have
concluded that Rubano, as a de facto parent, was entitled to
visitation. 146
The Rubano court further supported this position by noting
that the idea of finding parental rights in the absence of either
adoption or the traditional biological relationship found support in
other authorities. 147 In Troxel v. Granville,148 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the principle that a child's parent has a
fundamental right to make decisions regarding visitation. The
Rubano court noted, however, that Troxel recognized that "persons
outside the nuclear family" may become involved in
childrearing. 149 Further, the Rubano court noted that the High
Court's own precedent has described familial rights as relational arising out of the intimacies of daily association as well as from a
blood relationship. 150 Indeed, the High Court has noted the "clear
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3).
Id. at 970 n.13.
Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 43-3-3 (1956)).
Id. at 971.
Id. at 971 n.14.
The court noted that Rubano was also entitled to seek a remedy in the

superior court pursuant to its general equitable powers, but that the superior
court would have abstained, as a mater of comity, since suit was initiated in
the family court. Id. at 972.
147. Id. at 973-74.
148. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
149. 759 A.2d at 973 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. 57).
150. Id.
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distinction between a mere biological relationship and an actual
relationship of parental responsibility." 15 1 Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court considered the relational rights formed
through life shared in a common home so crucial that they may
sometimes trump the rights of a biological parent whose only
relationship with the child is formed outside the family unit.152
The Rubano court also voiced its agreement with states that
have looked beyond biological ties to find that some care giving
adults may become psychological parents. In V.C. v. M.B., 153 the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the same-sex partner of a
child's biological mother had become a psychological parent with
legally cognizable rights, when four criteria were met. 154 First, the
legal parent must consent to the relationship between the third
party and the child. Second, the third party must have lived with
the child. 155 Third, the third party must have performed parental
functions for the child "to a significant degree."' 156 Fourth, "a
parent-child bond must be formed."'157 The Rubano court noted
that these criteria underlie its own analysis. 158 It also commented
on the connection between these criteria and the principles
underlying the American Law Institute's most recent statement
on the law of family dissolution. 159 The bonds children form with
the adults who care for them are important, and must be
protected under the limited circumstances all authorities seem to
embrace. In light of Rhode Island's recognition of searching
rational basis review and the Rubano majority's affirmation of
same-sex parenting, an attempt to defend the existing limits of
Rhode Island's marriage law seems even more clearly doomed to
fail than the unsuccessful defense in Goodridge. Indeed, to argue
that marriage must be limited to opposite-sex couples to promote
151 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261
(1983)).
152. Id. at 974 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 (1989)).
153. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
154. Id. at 551.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 759 A.2d at 974.
159. Id. at 974-75 (citing the American Law Institute, Principles of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, ch 2 §§ 2.03 - 2.21 (Tent. Dr.
No.4, Apr. 10, 2000 & May 16, 2000)).
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child bearing and rearing seems not only irrational, but also
contrary to Rhode Island's existing precedent and policy.
CONCLUSION: IS THE PAST PROLOGUE?

16 0

Focusing on the Goodridge plurality opinion suggests that
recognition of gay marriage is completely consistent with existing
Rhode Island law. And so it is. But a discussion of the Goodridge
approach as a whole requires recognition that the dissenting
opinion outlined an alternative route that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court could also, conceivably, take. Although this
alternative route would lead a court to affirm existing restrictions
in the marriage law, it actually diverges from the criteria laid out
by the plurality only with regard to the standard of review.
The Goodridge dissent took issue with the plurality's
formulation of the standard of review by offering two alternative
perspectives. In the hands of the plurality, rational basis required
more than plausible assumptions - it incorporates medical
advancements, social science data and logic. The Goodridge
dissent suggested, first, that the plurality's rational basis review
was so searching that it distorted traditional rational basis beyond
recognition. 16 1 Traditional rational basis requires only that
legislators have some plausible justification for a given law. It
need not be persuasive. It must simply satisfy a "minimal
62
threshold of rationality."1
Alternatively, the Goodridge dissenters suggested that the
plurality's use of rational basis review was flawed not because it
was too willing to go beyond basic plausible rationales, but
because once one goes beyond basic, plausible rationales, two
contrary conclusions are possible. First, the Goodridge dissent
pointed out that people are free to raise their children in a variety
16 3
of family structures as long as the children are not harmed.
The state cannot interfere, but nor must it officially support every
option chosen. 164 Second, although some data suggests that the
160. With apologies to
1.261.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST,

Act II, Sc. I,

161. 798 N.E.2d at 980 (Sosman, J., dissenting) (describing the plurality's
standard of review as "some undefined stricter standard").

162. Id. at 978.
163. Id. at 979.
164. Id.
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children of same-sex parents flourish, other data is not so clear.
Given that openly homosexual parents are a fairly recent
phenomenon, no longitudinal study can conclusively demonstrate
the effect of such a family structure. 165 Thus, in the dissenter's
view, it was not irrational to offer the preferred status of marriage
to a family configuration that has enjoyed centuries of
acceptance. 66 Stripped of the gloss of political rhetoric, the
limitations on who may marry could be considered simply the
result of a preference for a time-tested formula over a new
67

formula. 1

Despite the Goodridge dissenters' view, under Rhode Island
law, marriage is a fundamental right that confers diverse benefits
on couples who marry, and significantly, on marital children.
Further, Rhode Island case law has affirmed the principle that
marriage, as an institution, can and should evolve. Also, under
Lawrence, the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment now protect intimate homosexual activity. Rhode
Island courts have acknowledged that same-sex parenting can be
consistent with the best interests of the child, and existing legal
structures can be adapted to address the problems of families
headed by same-sex couples. Finally, Rhode Island courts have
already used logic, evidence of past discrimination, and social
science data in applying rational basis review. In short, the
stepping stones that led a plurality of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court to rule that gay marriage is a constitutional
necessity are firmly in place in Rhode Island.

165. Id. at 980.
166. Id. at 981-82.
167. Id.

